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Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Assistance programs aimed at transforming core security providers 
(military, law enforcement, intelligence; defense and interior 
bureaucracies; oversight committees) into more effective, professional, 
and accountable state institutions
SSR is highly variable
 Context: Developing, Democratizing, and Fragile/Postwar States
 Reform process leadership
 Internally driven (South Africa, Poland, Ukraine, Indonesia)
 Mixed (Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone)
 Externally driven (Iraq, Kosovo, Timor Leste)
 Actors: Government Civilians, Military, NGOs, Contractors
Key Activity: Training and Advising for Institutional 
Capacity and Change
Tactical Training and Advising
 Variable settings: classroom, training 
centers, command posts, field-based, 
on-the-job
 Variable content: literacy, 
marksmanship, leadership, small unit 
tactics, operational and logistics 
planning, rule of law
 Variable trainers: regular military, 
military police, special forces, 
contractors | individuals, embedded 
teams, whole units
Ministerial Advising
 More stable setting: headquarters 
offices, planning/conference rooms, 
occasional field trips  
 More focused content: leadership, 
strategic policy, planning, budgeting 
processes, civ-mil relations, rule of law
 Mixed “Advisor Teams”: military 
officers, government civilians, civilian 
contractors
SSR Contracting and Research
 Types of Contracted Services in SSR and Conflict 
Environments
 Physical Security (bodyguards, base defense)
 Construction and Engineering Support (facilities, power, information tech)
 Logistics, Maintenance, and Life Support (food, water, waste management)
 Human and Organizational Capacity Building (i.e., “training and advising”)
 Current Research and Policy Focus 
 Government inspectors general/auditors prioritize oversight resources on 
largest reconstruction purchases (construction, arms shipments, logistics)
 Overwhelming academic focus on contractors’ “battlefield” legal status and 
regulation – contractors seen as as objects of SSR – particularly those 
providing physical security (Blackwater, Triple Canopy)
 Scarce attention to contractors as agents of SSR – reformers, trainers, and 
capacity builders
Contractors as Trainers and Advisors
Complexity of Procuring Training and 
Advising Services
 Variable needs for and type of training/advising over time 
 Level: Ministerial (strategic) vs. tactical
 Function:  Military vs. law enforcement
 Mission:  Dynamic environment and changing requirements
 Limited supply (labor pool) of truly qualified advisors
 Ideal traits: maturity, subject matter expertise, advanced cultural/language 
training, ability to teach, persuade, and influence in a foreign and hazardous 
environment
 Advisor effectiveness and quality are hard to evaluate
 Some host-nation institutions are different from U.S. (i.e., 
nationalized police force); leaves personnel with limited 
frame of reference to teach and mentor
Contract Theory and Complex Products
 The promise of contracting is the “win-win” outcome
 Perfunctory versus consummate behavior
 How do you contract for SSR Training and Advising Services when they:
 Are difficult to evaluate
 Complex, evolving, and context-driven
 Contracts demand flexibility (incomplete specification)
 Assets (human capital) are highly specific investments
 Lead to a complex contract design and high potential of “lock in”
 How do contracting frameworks (Brown et.al., 2010) for complex products, 
hold up for complex services in SSR environments like Afghanistan?
 Understanding Product/Service Complexity
 Importance of Rules (specificity, discretion)
 Importance of Relationship Strategies (incentives/penalties, repeat exchanges, reputation)
 Importance of Clear Communication & Understanding
 Performance Assessment &  Accountability
 Combine strengths of and avoid pitfalls associated with Rules or 
Relationships – Achieve cooperative behavior
Research Design
 In-depth study of U.S./NATO – Afghan Security Force partnership during 
Afghan Surge (‘08-’13).  Focus on advisors’ influencing approaches and 
institutional change.
 67 semi-structured, confidential interviews with elites (71min-avg)
 Participants served as advisors, trainers, or partnered role with Afghan 
security forces, or direct observers/evaluators
 Stratified, purposive sample: 
 level of analysis (strategic vs. tactical)
 V-H alignment with core Afghan security institutions (ministries, army, police) 
 type of advising/partnering (individual vs. embed team vs. unit partnership)
 participant attributes (rank, location, branch, civ-mil, regular/special forces)
 Substantial collection of secondary data
 Interview transcripts open coded in NVivo
 Individual participant attributes (rank, gender, age range, deployment dates)
 39 of 67 participants and 213 total references to contractor trainer-advisor 
employment
 Open coding of observations, organized into hierarchy of six emergent categories: 
contract design, oversight, performance, ministerial advising, tactical advising, 
contractor characteristics
Findings: Trainer-Advisor Selection
 Significant need for better screening of ministerial advisors
 Interviews reveal a range of performance and qualification 
outcomes; some asserting that the contracted personnel 
were well qualified (“we couldn’t live without them”) and 
others stating that their work experiences with contractors 
were less successful (“underwhelming” credentials, 
performance)
 Selecting by former rank and experience does provide some 
degree of “field-level” legitimacy and expertise with active 
military colleagues and host-nation officials 
 However, strong military or law enforcement record does not 
necessarily guarantee:
 Ability to train, advise, and influence others in a foreign setting
 Ability to build trust and constructive relationships
 Expertise to provide advise on political-strategic level policy issues
“for police advisors, just because you wore a badge doesn’t 
mean you could be a good police advisor.  I got a guy who’s a 
deputy sheriff in Norman, Oklahoma in a two-car police force.  
He knew how to give out tickets, he knew how to break up a 
bar fight, but as far as being a police professional to advise a 
country on how to set up their police force, no.  I mean I had 
another guy that was a retired inspector—that is a special 
advisor to the police commissioner of the city of New York, 
okay?  Contractors didn’t want to touch him but he was 
probably the best qualified guy to be an advisor, to be a police 
advisor….If he knew too much th  he’s liable to fix it and then 
we’re liable to go home and the gravy train’s gone.  So he 
ended up getting frustrated.  He ended up going home and 
going back to work for Ray Kelly in New York City” (author 
interview). 
I was slightly underwhelmed with the perform nc  of several 
contractors in terms of not only how they were doing the 
advising missio  but also their credentials f r doing so….We’re 
talking about building a Ministry of State at the highest levels 
of a sovereign nation and several of the contractors that I 
w rked with had never ever worked at an institutional level 
b ve division…Sever l of them have never worked at a 
headquarters staff, or in the Pentag n, or in any kind of civilian 
governance institution that they were eit er principally in 
charge of or in a very senior assisting role—it just struck me as 
increasingly odd.  Not that some of t m wer n’t good 
people…have great combat records, or military backgrounds, 
but that they simply did not hav  the depth of experience or 
perspective to d  their jobs at [that] level” (author interview).
I think one error we make acro s t b ard, not just in MoDA
[Ministry of Def nse Advisors program], is just hrowing people 
into advisory j bs, calling t m advisors, and they’re in many 
c ses more detriment l than they are ffectiv . So I think there 
h s to b a re l h d el ction ro ss to pick the rig t people.  
In fact, I’ve told [a G neral], for example, if he were putting 
toget r a team of l t’s say 10 guys to go o—I’ll pick a 
country—Guatemala, I wouldn’t care what the ther nine were 
like, but I would want the te lead r to be the Zen master 
rel tionship builder because with that you can bring in subject
matter exper s all day l ng, but if you don’t hav  the 
relations ip, a subject matter expert is a waste of time.” 
(author int rview).
if anybody want d to spend one m re dollar adding  
little more scruti y to the preparation of advisors and
scree ing of advisors, I would t ink that would be worth 
probably $10 in sa i gs of having th  wrong p ple out th r —
not only the wrong peopl , but e ple that create system  and 
probl ms t at cause mor  pr blems in th long ru ” (aut or
intervi w).
Findings:  Advisor Selection 
& Contract Design
 Weakly specified hiring and quality requirements—in terms of education, 
experience, skills, training, and performance—seemed to almost perpetuate the 
contractor’s role in service provision
 Contracts and SOWs for advisors and trainers were viewed as rigid and 
incomplete, highly specified on input and output metrics, but divorced from 
meaningful measurement of outcomes and mission attainment
 Little to no goal alignment. Contractors typically had more experience, had been 
on the ground longer, possessed more institutional memory, but were only going 
to do what their contract required them to do
 Respondents were clear that there is insufficient contract management and 
oversight capacity within the government
 Varied responses on contractors performing inherently governmental functions.  
Ministerial advisors clearly operating in a grey area.
“quality is not written into the contracts” (author interview)
“if people went over there knowing that they had to stay until it was 
finished, I guarantee you it wouldn’t be 10 years” (author interview)
Findings: Thin Labor Market
 Afghan Surge period (2008-2012) coincided with a significant increase in 
demand for advisors and trainers across the country to accelerate 
Afghan Security Force development.
 In 2010, DynCorp took over contracts to provide advisor support to both 
the Afghan MoI and MoD:
 Increased demand led to a diluted labor market for qualified trainers and 
advisors:
 DynCorp could only fill 300 of 728 (41%) MoI contractor positions within 120 
days (GAO)
 Participants observed noticeable trade off between overall quality and scale 
of contractors
 The need to fill slots was viewed as more important than selecting quality 
personnel due to the $10,000/day penalty.
“over time, you have less qualified advisors” (author interview)
“they’re fielding people that shouldn’t be fielded, but they have to or they 
will be fined so many tens of thousands per day” (author interview)
Developing a SSR Contracting 
Framework
 Evaluating Brown, et al.’s (2010) framework for SSR 
Contracting
 Highly relevant to address buyer-seller uncertainty and contract 
incompleteness
 Limited in suggesting context-specific governance mechanisms that 
would hold up in a complex contracting environment like Afghanistan. 
 Contract Design
 Agreement on several levels that SOWs and performance must be 
more clearly stated, agreed upon, monitored, measured, and evaluated 
against expected benchmarks or redressed through joint mediation 
and arbitration processes.
 Contract penalties were counterproductive for ensuring quality
 Specificity of the SOWs and performance measures should not be 
confused with the capabilities required to achieve mission goals.
 Contracting for Complex Services – Less Guidance, Equally 
Important
Next Steps
Analyzing second round of interviews with current 
and former SSR contract employees (DynCorp, 
MPRI)







 Explore/evaluate alternative civil-military authority 
relationships and organizational designs for multi-lateral 
training and advising missions
Questions and Comments?
Case Study:  Afghanistan Training 
and Advising Contracts
 Training and advising contracts account for just over 5% of total U.S. 
spending on Afghanistan’s reconstruction
 $5 billion is small relative other reconstruction costs, but still significant in 
absolute terms
Timeline of Afghan Training 
and Advising Contracts
Select Data on Advisor-Trainer Selection
“I was slightly underwhelmed with the performance of several contractors in terms of not only how they were doing the 
advising mission but also their credentials for doing so….We’re talking about building a Ministry of State at the highest levels 
of a sovereign nation and several of the contractors that I worked with had never ever worked at an institutional level above
division…Several of them have never worked at a headquarters staff, or in the Pentagon, or in any kind of civilian governance 
institution that they were either principally in charge of or in a very senior assisting role—it just struck me as increasingly odd.  
Not that some of them weren’t good people…have great combat records, or military backgrounds, but that they simply did not 
have the depth of experience or perspective to do their jobs at [that] level” (author interview).
“I think if anybody wanted to spend one more dollar adding a little more scrutiny to the preparation of advisors and screening 
of advisors, I would think that would be worth probably $10 in savings of having the wrong people out there—not only the 
wrong people, but people that create systems and problems that cause more problems in the long run” (author interview).
“I think one error we make across the board, not just in MoDA [Ministry of Defense Advisors program], is just throwing people 
into advisory jobs, calling them advisors, and they’re in many cases more detrimental than they are effective. So I think there 
has to be a real hard selection process to pick the right people.  In fact, I’ve told [a General], for example, if he were putting 
together a team of let’s say 10 guys to go to—I’ll pick a country—Guatemala, I wouldn’t care what the other nine were like, but I 
would want the team leader to be the Zen master relationship builder because with that you can bring in subject matter 
experts all day long, but if you don’t have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time.” (author interview).
“for police advisors, just because you wore a badge doesn’t mean you could be a good police advisor.  I got a guy who’s a 
deputy sheriff in Norman, Oklahoma in a two-car police force.  He knew how to give out tickets, he knew how to break up a bar 
fight, but as far as being a police professional to advise a country on how to set up their police force, no.  I mean I had another 
guy that was a retired inspector—that is a special advisor to the police commissioner of the city of New York, okay?  
Contractors didn’t want to touch him but he was probably the best qualified guy to be an advisor, to be a police advisor….If he 
knew too much then he’s liable to fix it and then we’re liable to go home and the gravy train’s gone.  So he ended up getting
frustrated.  He ended up going home and going back to work for Ray Kelly in New York City” (author interview). 
Key Elements of Being a Good Advisor
Excerpt from Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) Advisor Guide, Version 1.0, May 2011, p. 6-11.
General Qualifications for Contract-Advisors
Excerpt from Afghan MoD Performance Based Statement of Work, Contract W91CRB-1-C-
0030, Oct. 9, 2011, pp. 3-5.
Specific Task Descriptions for Contract-Advisors
Excerpt from Afghan MoD Performance Based Statement of Work, Contract W91CRB-1-C-
0030, Oct. 9, 2011, pp. 6-7, 47-49.
DynCorp Job Posting for MoD Acquisition Advisor-Mentor
Accessed on April 8, 2013 at http://jobs.jobs/, Search terms: DynCorp, Ministry of Defense, Kabul
DCAA Audit of DynCorp’s CIVPOL Billing Practices, 2004-
2005
Excerpt from DCAA Audit Report, Nov. 27, 2009, pp. 1-2, 14-15.
